Study: Regulatory Response to Outbreak Was Broken
Federal agencies provided a slow and disjointed response to the multi-state Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak of 2008, a combination of shortcomings that left Americans vulnerable to the sickness for too long and unduly hurt fortunes in the tomato industry, according to an academic report released Monday
From its inception in late May to its official end on Aug. 28, 2008, the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak sickened more than 1,400 Americans and cost the tomato industry more than $114 million in Florida and Georgia alone. For more than a month during the outbreak, health officials were warning consumers not to eat tomatoes. But in the end, federal officials discovered that the true vectors for the spread of the illness were jalapeno and serrano peppers grown in Mexico and shipped from a distribution center in Texas. 
The Produce Safety Project, an initiative of The Pew Charitable Trusts at Georgetown University, said its findings once again show a need for organizational reforms throughout the public health system for a more coordinated outbreak response. In addition, the report recommends that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) flex its existing authority to establish mandatory safety standards for fresh produce.
"The Obama Administration shoud make the establishment of mandatory, enforceable safety standards for fresh produce a food safety priority and take steps to fix our broken outbreak response system,'' said Jim O'Hara, director of the Produce Safety Project.
Here are some of the findings from the report, which is available in its entirety by clicking here:
- When the FDA issued its nationwide consumer advisory on June 7 to avoid certain tomatoes, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that 145 people had been infected. In reality, the number was more than 800, or 55 percent of the outbreak total. Being slow to tally confirmed cases could have delayed the investigation.
- The states of New Mexico, Colorado and Texas got off to a fast start in recognizing the outbreak and they efficiently exchanged information on daily conference calls starting in late May. The CDC was notified within one day after state officials discovered that a number of cases shared the same genetic fingerprint, but it took CDC three days to notify FDA. And the FDA -- the agency that would have to take the lead in any multi-state investigation and traceback of contaminated produce -- didn't join the daily conference calls until four days later.
- Two "cluster'' investigations in Texas that were finished in late June implicated raw jalapeno peppers in salsa as a likely source of illness. But at a June 27 press briefing, after the finding was made, CDC officials would only say they were looking at other kinds of produce in addition to tomatoes. By July 1, despite growing evidence that peppers may be the cause of the outbreak, the CDC and FDA were still referring to tomatoes as "the lead suspect and our main focus.''
- Federal officials should have had doubts about tomatoes as early as mid-June because their June 7 advisory wasn't a significant factor in slowing the outbreak's progression. When advisories are correct, they are often followed by an acute slowdown in the spread of illness.
- An opinion poll commissioned by the Produce Safety Project indicated that federal inaction on the issue of foodborne illness "may well be eroding public confidence in the safety of the food supply.'' Sixty percent of respondents believed government food safety agencies are doing only a fair or poor job.
